Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown by Whisenand, Dave
Public Land and Resources Law Review
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2010-2011
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v.
Brown
Dave Whisenand
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr
This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Land and Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Whisenand, Dave (2013) "Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown," Public Land and Resources Law Review: Vol. 0 , Article
3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss1/3
 Page | 22  
 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 617 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 
Dave Whisenand 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center v. Brown in August 2010.
157
  The plaintiff in this case, Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center (NEDC), is an Oregon non-profit corporation who sued under the 
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
158
  The defendants were:  Marvin Brown in 
his official capacity as Oregon State Forester, members of the Oregon Board of Forestry in their 
official capacities, Hampton Tree Farms Inc., Stimson Lumber Company, Georgiapacific West 
Inc., Swanson Group Inc., and Tillamook County, who were all involved to some degree in 
either logging the areas at issue or maintaining the access roads.
159
   
The issue presented was whether runoff from logging roads delivered to streams through 
ditches, channels, and culverts constituted point source discharge subject to the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
160
  The court held that natural runoff 
becomes point source discharge subject to the NPDES when channeled through ―discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance[s]‖161 such as ditches, culverts, and channels.162  Accordingly, 
the court reversed the district court‘s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings to 
determine whether CWA violations occurred.
163
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
                                                          
157
 Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 617 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).  
158
 Id. at 1180 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006)).   
159
 Id. at 1179.   
160
 Id. at 1181.   
161
 Id. at 1181 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).   
162
 Id. at 1197.   
163
 Id.  
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 The roads at issue were the Trask River Road, parallel to the South Fork Trask River, and 
the Sam Downs Road, parallel to the Little South Fork of the Kilchis River. Both roads were 
located in Western Oregon and owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon 
Board of Forestry.
 164
  Timber sales contracts with the State of Oregon allowed timber companies 
to use the roads to access logging sites and haul timber out of the forest.
165
  The contracts 
provided the Oregon Board of Forestry was responsible for maintaining these roads and their 
stormwater collection systems.
166
  Both roads were ―designed and constructed with systems of 
ditches, culverts, and channels‖ that directed runoff to streams.167   
Runoff from forest roads used for logging is a major contributor of sediment to streams, 
rivers, and lakes.
168
  Timber hauling grinds up gravel and rocks found on logging roads, which is 
then directed by the road runoff collection systems to nearby streams and rivers.
169
  Sediment 
adversely affects fish, such as salmon and trout, by ―smothering eggs, reducing oxygen levels, 
interfering with feeding, and burying insects that provide food.‖170   
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
At the district court, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants‘ maintenance of roads and 
runoff systems caused large amounts of sediment to be deposited in both the South Fork Trask 
River and the Little South Fork of the Kilchis River.
171
  The plaintiff argued that the runoff 
systems associated with these roads acted as point sources by directing sediment to rivers and 
that this violated the CWA because none of the defendants had NPDES permits.
172
  The district 
                                                          
164
 Id. at 1179. 
165
 Id.   
166
 Id.   
167
 Id.   
168
 Id. at 1180. 
169
 Id. at 1179. 
170
 Id. at 1180.   
171
 Id.  
172
 Id.   
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court concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency‘s (EPA) Silvicultural Rule, because 
promulgated under the CWA, exempted discharge associated with logging activities from the 
NPDES permitting process, and thus did not reach the question of whether the 1987 amendments 
to the CWA statutorily exempted discharge associated with logging from the CWA.
173
  
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.
174
  Plaintiffs timely appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
175
   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The Silvicultural Rule 
 Reviewing de novo, the court looked at the history of the Silvicultural Rule.
176
  The EPA 
promulgated the Silvicultural Rule shortly after Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA), which later became the Clean Water Act.
177
  The FWPCA imposed 
stringent permitting requirements on point sources.
178
  The Silvicultural Rule categorically 
exempted several kinds of discharges, including discharges from silvicultural activities.
179
 
The Silvicultural Rule was first challenged in Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Train; the plaintiff claimed the definition of a silvicultural point source was impermissible 
because it was inconsistent with the statutory definition.
180
  The district court in Natural 
Resources Defense Council concluded the EPA had the authority to clarify by regulation, but 
could not promulgate regulations that were inconsistent with the statutory definition of a point 
source.
181
  While appeal was pending, the EPA revised the Silvicultural Rule to define specific 
                                                          
173
 Id. at 1179 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2010)).   
174
 Id. 
175
 Id. at 1180.   
176
 Id. at 1180, 1184 
177
 Id. at 1181.  
178
 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)).   
179
 Id. at 1184-1185.   
180
 Id. at 1185 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 396 F. Supp 1393 (D.D.C. 1975)).   
181
 Id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 396 F. Supp 1393 (D.D.C. 1975)).   
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activities as silvicultural point sources.
182
  Under this revision, runoff from all other silvicultural 
activities, even when directed via channels, culverts, and ditches, were considered non-point 
sources.
183
 
 Congress amended the CWA in 1987 to address stormwater discharge.
184
  This 
amendment established a tiered approach to NPDES permits and allowed the EPA to identify the 
most significant stormwater discharges and require permits for these discharges under ―Phase 
I‖185 regulations.186  The EPA promulgated ―Phase I‖ stormwater regulations in 1990.187  The 
―Phase I‖ regulations identified five significant discharge sources, including one relevant to this 
case: discharge ―associated with industrial activity.‖188  However, the EPA still purported to 
exclude any discharge previously excluded under the Silvicultural Rule from ―Phase I‖ 
regulations.
189
  
The court next analyzed the EPA‘s interpretation of the CWA definition of point source 
discharge.
190
  The court held that the Silvicultural Rule was an impermissible interpretation of 
the CWA because it created a category of silvicultural non-point sources that under the statutory 
definition are point sources.
191
  The court reasoned that by statute, natural runoff becomes point 
source discharge when directed by ―discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance[s]‖ through a 
system of ditches, culverts, and channels to a stream or river.
192
  In making this determination, 
                                                          
182
 Id. (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 6282 (Feb. 12, 1976)). 
183
 Id. at 1186.   
184
 Id. at 1193.   
185
 Id. at 1193-1194.  ―Phase I‖ stormwater regulations were issued by the EPA in 1990 targeting discharge 
―associated with industrial activity.‖  All remaining stormwater discharges were to be covered by ―Phase II‖ 
regulations and EPA was to issue these regulations based on their study of unregulated stormwater discharges.  
―Phase II‖ regulations were promulgated in 2006.  Id.   
186
 Id. at 1193. 
187
 Id.   
188
 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B)).   
189
 Id. (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48011 (Nov. 16, 1990).   
190
 Id. at 1189-1190.  
191
 Id. at 1190. 
192
 Id. at 1190-1191 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).   
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the court relied, in part, on the analysis in Environmental Protection Information Center v. 
Pacific Lumber Co. (EPIC).
193
  Specifically, the court agreed with the EPIC court that the 
statutory definition of a point source trumps the regulatory definition.
194
  As a result, the court 
held that if discharge is collected and channeled through a system of ditches, channels, and 
culverts, it is point source discharge requiring a NPDES permit.
195
  
B.  1987 Amendments to the CWA  
 The district court did not reach the defendants‘ claim that the 1987 amendments to the 
CWA prevented the NPDES program from applying to stormwater discharge associated with 
silvicultural activity.
196
  Based on the 1987 amendments to the CWA, the defendants presented 
two arguments:
197
  (1) that Congress approved of the Silvicultural Rule by choosing not to revise 
it; and, (2) that ―Phase I‖ stormwater regulations did not apply to the roads at issue because they 
did not fit the regulatory definition of ―associated with industrial activity.‖198 
The court first addressed the defendants‘ congressional approval through acquiescence 
argument.
199
  For a court to find Congress approved through acquiescence, there must be 
―overwhelming evidence‖ that it was Congress‘ intent to approve the specific existing 
regulation.
200
  The court distinguished this case from instances of Congressional approval 
through acquiescence by reasoning that, in this case, the 1987 CWA amendments resulted in 
fundamental changes to the statutory treatment of stormwater regulation, and the regulation was 
                                                          
193
 Id. at 1191 (see Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 2003 WL 25506817 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003)). 
194
 Id. 
195
 Id.   
196
 Id. at 1191-1192.    
197
 Id. at 1194-1195.   
198
 Id. at 1195.  
199
 Id. at 1191. 
200
 Id. at 1193 (citing Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 
162 (2001)).     
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clearly inconsistent with the statutory language.
201
  In summary, the court did not find any 
evidence whatsoever that Congress intended to approve of the Silvicultural Rule.
202
   
The court then addressed the defendants‘ claim that the logging roads did not fall within 
the regulatory definition of discharge associated with industrial activity.
203
  The court relied on 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency in concluding that 
when logging activity is industrial in nature, the EPA cannot create exemptions to statutorily 
required permits, and thus, the 1987 amendments to the CWA do not preclude NPDES permit 
requirements from applying to these roads.
204
  The court recognized these logging roads were 
often used for recreation, but concluded their primary use was clearly for logging.
205
  The court 
also concluded that ―immediate access roads‖ included roads such as the logging roads in this 
case because they were ―exclusively or primarily‖ dedicated to industrial use.206  Finally, the 
court disposed of the defendants‘ argument that the logging industry should not be classified as 
an industrial use.  In doing so, it referenced the broad approach of the ―Phase I‖ regulations that 
include many industrial facilities beyond traditional industrial plants, such as mines, junkyards, 
and construction sites.
207
 
C. Effect of Remand in Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA 
Despite suggestion by amicus United States that the Ninth Circuit should delay this 
decision until EPA responded to remand in Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA by 
promulgating ―Phase II‖ regulations applicable to discharge from logging roads, the court 
                                                          
201
 Id. at 1191.   
202
 Id. 
203
 Id. at 1194-1995.  
204
 Id. at 1195-1996 (see Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 
1992)).   
205
 Id. at 1195.   
206
 Id.   
207
 Id. at 1195-1996 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii), (v), (x) (2010)). 
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concluded that EPA‘s promulgation of ―Phase II‖ regulations did not lessen its statutory 
obligation.
208
  Thus, the court saw no reason to wait for EPA‘s response before remanding. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Sediment delivered to streams and rivers from logging roads represents one of the largest 
threats to trout and salmon preservation in the Pacific Northwest.  This decision may be the first 
step toward applying CWA regulations to logging roads.  In holding that the EPA cannot 
categorically exclude silvicultural discharges from the statutory definition of a point source, the 
court has created a precedent that can be used to expand the application of the NPDES program 
and require the EPA to account for significant sources of pollution that have previously been 
ignored.  However, the defendants still have the opportunity to request rehearing en banc from 
the Ninth Circuit, or possibly review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Without an en banc reversal, 
this case will go back to the district court to determine whether the alleged violations occurred.  
Regardless of the district court‘s decision, precedent has now been set that discharge from 
logging roads that is channeled through a runoff system constitutes a point source.   
  
                                                          
208
 Id. at 1196 (citing Environmental Defense Center, Inc v. EPA, 344 F. 3d 832, 863 (9th Cir. 2003)).    
